THE DAY AND SAIL ANALOGIES IN PLATO'S *PARMENIDES*

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I AM HERE CONCERNED with the following exchange between Parmenides and Socrates in *Parm.* 131a4–e7:[1]

(Parm.)—Do you think that the whole (ὅλον) Form, being one (ἓν ὄν),[2] is in each of the many (participants), or how? (131a8–9)

(Soc.)—Yes, for what would prevent it from being in each?[3] (131a10–11)

—Well, while it is one and the same,[4] the whole of it would then be in many separate participants at once, and thus it would itself be separate from itself.[5] (131b1–2)

—No, it would not, if it were like the day, which is one and the same and in many places at once and nonetheless not separate from itself. If it were that way, then each of the Forms, though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once. (131b3–6)

—That is very neat. You make one and the same thing to be in many places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and then claimed that it was the whole of the one (self-same) sail that was over each of them.[6] Or isn't that the sort of thing you mean to say? (131b7–9)

The present paper elaborates on a position put forth in my doctoral dissertation (*Plato's Parmenides*, University of St. Andrews, 1977). I presented substantially the same position in a paper read at the Canadian Philosophical Association meeting in London, Ontario in 1978. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making a number of valuable suggestions on an earlier draft of the paper.

[1]The translation below is based on those by H. N. Fowler (in the Loeb edition) and F. M. Cornford in *Plato and Parmenides* (London 1939).

[2]"One = single" here must mean "unique." The sense here is, as it will become obvious at 131b1–2, that the whole of the self-same Form will be in *each* of its many participants. The assumption here is that there is only one Form of a given kind. See below, n. 4.

[3]The MSS read ἓν εἶναι. But reading ἓν εἶναι unnaturally shifts the emphasis, in Parmenides' question at 131a8–9, from "presence in" to "oneness." So, I accept Fowler's and Cornford's (85, n. 1) reading of ἐνεῖναι.

[4]ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν . . . ὅλον. (i) The ἓν ὄν here need not of course pick up 131a10–11 read as ἓν εἶναι. Parmenides is more naturally picking up the point made in his initial question at 131a8–9, that ὅλον τὸ εἶδος . . . ἓν ὄν. (ii) The addition of καὶ ταὐτὸν here makes it certain that it is one and the same Form which is to be, in its entirety, present in *each* of the many participants. Hence, the assumption that there is only one Form of a given kind. See above, n. 2.

[5]αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς. Since this is contrasted with ἓν ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν, we have another reason for thinking that ἓν means "unique." To be "separate from itself," is to become at least "numerically many," to multiply itself, as opposed to being "numerically just one."

[6]"The whole of the one (selfsame) sail that was over each of them" is the sense of ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον, as 131c2–3 makes clear and as is demanded by consistency with the analogous point made in the Day analogy.

—Perhaps. (131c1)
—Would the whole sail be over each person, or part of it over one and part over another? (131c2–3)
—A part.
—Therefore, the Forms themselves are divisible. Their participants would partake of parts of them. Not the whole but only a part of each Form would be in each participant. (131c5–7)
—So it appears.
—Do you then really mean to assert[7] that the single Form is really divided for us, and yet that it will still be one?[8] (131c9–10)
—Not at all.
—No, for consider. If you divide largeness itself . . . . [Parmenides proceeds now to demonstrate certain paradoxes which follow upon the division of forms.] (131c12–e2)
—How then will other things partake of those Forms of yours, if they cannot partake of them as parts or as wholes? (131e3–5)
—Really, it seems no easy matter to determine in any way. (131e6–7)

The quoted exchange is a dialectical scrutiny of the general hypothesis, advanced at 131a4–5, that *participation* between Forms and sensibles[9] is

[7] ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις . . . φάναι. The verb ἐθέλω denotes not mere "wish" but "wish with design" (see LSJ s.v. ἐθέλω). The particle is emphatic. I take it, the sense of Parmenides' question is something like, "If you consciously thought about the issue on its own, independently of our present argument, would you really wish to hold that the one Form is actually divided?" I am not sure, furthermore, that τῇ ἀληθείᾳ here must mean "actually" (Cornford) or "really" (Fowler). It may, equally naturally and plausibly in the context, mean "by nature." That is, the sense might be, ". . . wish to hold that the one Form is, by (in) its nature, divided," when "by nature" it is *one*. For the sense of "one" see below, n. 8.

[8] It is not at all clear whether καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται is an independent clause or still governed by φάναι. Cornford takes it as the former, since he punctuates after "divided" and starts a new sentence, "Will it still be one?" (85). Cornford may well be right. The difficulty with Parmenides' question at 131c9–10 is that it looks both forward and backward. The part of the question that prompts the reply οὐδαμῶς (131c11), and solicits the elaboration by means of the paradoxes at 131c12 ff., is "Would you really wish to hold that the one Form is really divided?" However, Socrates' reply, οὐδαμῶς, is surely forthcoming not because of the the paradoxes Parmenides has yet to rehearse, but for reasons of his own which, we may reasonably presume, have to do with what he has claimed or assumed earlier in their argument. The phrase καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται contains the clue as to the reason Socrates himself might have for saying οὐδαμῶς. So, even if καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται is grammatically and syntactically independent of φάναι . . . μερίζεσθαι, still the thought it expresses is the thought which guides Socrates in answering οὐδαμῶς. Hence, regardless of the syntactical status of the phrase, there is a contrast between μερίζεσθαι and ἓν ἔσται. Accordingly, the sense of ἓν here is "indivisible." Indeed, we are here told explicitly what has been a standing assumption throughout the discussion, that ἓν means both "just one" and "indivisible." In fact, the self-same Form must be present, if it is to be present at all, in its entirety in each and every instance because it is "just one" and "indivisible."

[9] For reasons why the first part of the *Parmenides* is concerned only with the relation between Forms and their *sensible* instances, see S. Panagiotou, "Vlastos on *Parmenides* 132a1–b2: Some of his Text and Logic," *PhilQuart* 21 (1971) 255–259, and "The *Parmenides* and the 'Communion of Kinds' in the *Sophist*," *Hermes* 109 (1981) 167–171.

effected by the *presence* of the former *in* the latter. It is also part of the general hypothesis that *participation qua presence in* can only be effected in one or the other of only two ways: either the whole or else only part of the Form may be present in sensibles (see 131a5–7). The ostensible conclusion of the scrutiny (131e3–5) is that the notion of *participation qua presence in* is problematic, since each of the two possible ways of effecting it is problematic. However, during the exchange Socrates is represented initially, in his Day analogy, as thinking that the first alternative (presence of the whole) is not problematic, though he is made to backtrack, hesitantly (?), under pressure from Parmenides' Sail analogy. Is Socrates right in retreating from his initial position? Or, what amounts in effect to the same thing, can Parmenides legitimately substitute the Sail for the Day? On the answer to this question turns, to a very large extent, the view one takes of this entire section of the *Parmenides*.

What follows is an attempt to offer an answer to this question. My principal claim will be that the two illustrations, the Day and the Sail, are analogous in the relevant respects and that hence Plato takes seriously the considerations adduced by Parmenides. Plato presents Socrates' Day analogy not as a step in the right direction, from which he is "forced," unfairly and wrongly, to retreat, but as a false cast which becomes more obviously such when the Day is replaced by the Sail. If this is so, then Socrates' Day cannot save Plato's middle-period theory of participation.

I

The two ways of effecting *participation* are thought to be untenable because they have consequences which conflict with the "oneness" of the Form. Each way destroys a different aspect of this "oneness." The presence of the whole Form destroys its uniqueness, while the presence of only a part of it destroys its indivisibility.[10] Parmenides' direct point against presence of the whole Form is that such presence requires that the one Form becomes, as it were, multiplied by the number of places involved (131b1–2). We are not told why this should be so, but Socrates evidently sees through Parmenides' laconic refutation since he offers the Day analogy in response. I take it, then, that the Day analogy is intended to capture and illuminate those points involved in the hypothesis under discussion which form the target of Parmenides' terse refutation at 131b1–2. The Day analogy brings out the following propositions:

(D1) a given form, X, is present in several sensibles at once,
(D2) X is present (as a whole),

[10]See A. E. Taylor, "On the First Part of Plato's *Parmenides*," *Mind* NS 12 (1903) 11–12 and *Plato: The Man and His Work*[4] (London 1930) 354.

(D3) X is indivisible (one),
(D4) there is one and only one X.

It must be one of the above propositions or their conjunction or an assumption embodied in them which forms the target of Parmenides' objection at 131b1–2. But we do not know what Parmenides thinks is going wrong here until we hear his rejoinder, the Sail analogy. This analogy makes it perfectly clear that, on Parmenides' view, propositions (D1)–(D4) jointly presuppose the following proposition:

(S) It is possible for one and the same thing to be present as a whole in many places at once.[11]

Now the Sail analogy is intended to illustrate at once the falsity of (S) and the truth of its contradictory proposition:

(P) It is impossible for one and the same thing to be present as a whole in many places at once.

We should be clear about the function of the Sail analogy in the exchange. It serves of course to introduce the second alternative of *presence in*, namely "presence in part." It also shows or purports to show that the Day analogy does not establish the point Socrates proffers. But, in so doing, the Sail analogy also indicates the type of consideration which led Parmenides to argue, at 131b1–2, that the Form will be "separate from itself." In keeping with this multiple function of the Sail analogy, it is more profitable, and indeed more accurate, to say that although he has (P) very much in mind, Parmenides works with two propositions that are different from but both corollary to (P), namely:

(P1) It is possible for things of the same type to be in many places at once, provided they are numerically distinct from one another, and

(P2) It is possible for different parts of one and the same thing to be in many places at once.

(P) and (P1) underlie Parmenides' argument prior to the Sail analogy, while (P) and (P2) underlie his argument subsequent to it. It is because he holds to (P) and (P1) that Parmenides suggests at 131b1–2 that the one Form will have to become many and distinct Forms.

Given that (S) is false while (P) and (P1) are true, we must jettison one of the propositions (D1)–(D4), since, without (S), at least one of them will turn out to be false. Which proposition is to be rejected? Well, neither (D4) nor

[11]Notice how Parmenides introduces the Sail analogy. "You, neatly (i.e., conveniently), make one and the same thing . . . ." His point is obviously that one and the same thing cannot be in many places at once, which I formulate below as (P).

(D3) should be rejected, since they assert the uniqueness and incompositeness of the Forms and these features we must preserve. (D1) cannot very well be eliminated at this stage, since it describes the general hypothesis under review, and this is not what is under scrutiny here. What is under scrutiny is the specific way of effecting "participation," and this is described by the statement of (D2). Consequently, (D2) is rejected in favour of its sole alternative, namely that only a part of the Form is present in its sensible instances. The sail analogy thus yields a new set of propositions as follows:

(S1) a given Form, X, is present in several sensibles at once,
(S2) X is present in part,
(S3) X is indivisible (one),
(S4) there is one and only one X.

It will be noticed that the only difference between this and the previous set is contained in proposition (S2). Now, although it eliminates the previous difficulties, (S2) introduces other problems. First, as Parmenides quickly points out, if parts of the Form are present in several distinct particulars, the Form must be divisible and indeed divided. This conclusion, however, contradicts the assertion in (S3) that the Form is one = indivisible (see 131c9–10). Second, (S2) in itself implies consequences which are absurd. These are outlined at 131c12–e1. I have argued elsewhere (*Phoenix* 36 [1982] 45–52) that the absurdities rehearsed here can be best explained if we see them as applying to the explanatory or, generally, to the functional aspect of (ontologically) divisible Forms. Having insinuated at 131c9–10 that it would be inconsistent to maintain that a Form is both "divided" and "indivisible," Parmenides proceeds, on the assumption that someone may opt for the division or divisibility of Forms, to argue that the explanatory function of divisible Forms is then delegated to their various "parts." But, such explanations, accounts, or definitions as are given in terms of "parts" will be hopelessly and absurdly incomplete. For this reason, and because it contradicts (S3), (S2) must itself be rejected. Since both (S2) and (D2) must be rejected, the over-all conclusion of the exchange is that *participation* cannot be construed as the *presence* of Forms *in* their sensible instances (131e3–5).

Given the truth of (P), Parmenides obviously regards the Form's uniqueness and indivisibility as incompatible. The Form is either unique but divisible or else it is indivisible but not unique. That is, the two aspects of a Form's unity come into conflict. It must be emphasized here that this conflict is *not* thought to arise when the Form is considered "in and by itself." Rather it is supposed to arise when the Form is considered as a relatum in "participation," *as this relation is envisaged here*. In his Day analogy, on the other hand, Socrates claims that (S) is true and, therefore, neither the uniqueness nor the indivisibility of the Form needs to be compromised.

It is difficult to decide which of the two alternatives, (P) or (S), Plato meant his readers to embrace, and the choice will of course affect radically

the view one might take of this entire section. One might think that (P) is true only in so far as it applies to sensible particulars, but false when applied also to Forms. For the Forms, qua universals, are precisely the kind of things which may be present in many places at once. In other words, one might suppose that the Day analogy makes the same point that Russell made when he asserted that it is one of the distinguishing features between universals and particulars that the former may, while the latter cannot, be in many places at once.[12] On this view, Parmenides seems to be confusing the Forms with their sensible, particular instances. This view may be thought to find support in Socrates' suggestion, at 128e5–130a2, that Zeno, in his reductive proofs that τὰ ὄντα οὐ πολλά ἐστι (see 127e1–128a1) has failed to distinguish between ὄντα which are "visible" (130a1) and ὄντα which are "intelligible" (130a2). Perhaps, then, the juxtaposition of the two analogies serves to illustrate the same confusion on the part of Parmenides;[13] that is, though he ostensibly deals with "intelligibles," he manages to deduce impossible consequences for them by treating them as if they were "sensibles."

Although the above view is plausible, I think it is wrong on two related counts. First, it fails to place the two analogies in the context of Plato's over-all aim in this section, namely the refutation of *participation qua the presence in* sensibles of Forms. Second, it simply assumes that the two analogies are meant to be radically different. Since the last point is crucial to the whole argument, I propose now to look at the analogies in some detail.

II

Parmenides evidently thinks that his own analogy of the Sail is identical in the relevant aspects with Socrates' own illustration of the Day. Furthermore, since he arrives at his conclusion by means of transparently valid steps (131c2–7), he reasons that what has gone wrong, and what accounts for the discrepancy between his and Socrates' conclusion, is the latter's assumption of (S). It seems, therefore, that there are some considerations here which can help us decide on either (S) or (P); namely, whether or not the two analogies are similar in the relevant aspects. If they are, then (P) ought to be accepted; if they are not, then we have reason to suspect that Socrates and Parmenides are talking at cross purposes.

It seems to be the received opinion that the two analogies are *not* identical in the relevant aspects, and that Parmenides forces the "young" Socrates into accepting them as such. Crombie's comments on this passage are typical of this view:

Whatever defects Socrates' "one day in many places" may have as an illustration of the relation of a property to its instances, it has one immense merit which Parmen-

[12]B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* (London 1956) 121.

[13]As R. K. Sprague thinks in "Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox," *Phronesis* 12 (1967) 91–98, at 96.

ides' "one sail over many men" lacks; for the principle of individuation of sails and human bodies are roughly the same in kind. For this reason the unity of a day in various places is fairly analogous to the unity of a property in its various instances. Socrates ought never to have accepted Parmenides' illustration in place of his own (his hesitant agreement shows that he himself had doubts), and it must surely be significant that he is railroaded into accepting it.[14]

Weingartner has the same points in mind when he comments:

. . . But of course it is not fair [the substitution of Sail for Day]. If the day were regarded as consisting of the sun's rays, rays that are absorbed by him on whom they shine, only then would you and I partake of the same day precisely as we might share a sail covering us. Yet surely this is not how we normally think of a day.[15]

The received opinion seems to rest on one or more of the following three points. First, it is assumed that Socrates means "day" as opposed to "daylight." Second, the principle of individuation of "day" is different from that of "daylight," "sail," and "men;" or, what underpins this suggestion, "day" is a different kind of entity from the other three, and hence we refer to it in a radically different way. Third, an appeal is made to Socrates' hesitant assent at 131c1, as indicating his own misgivings about the appropriateness of Parmenides' example. I think there are serious objections to all three points outlined above.

In reply to the first two points, one may start by making explicit the two different meanings of the term ἡμέρα which, on the received opinion, are relevant here. ἡμέρα may be used to refer either to the time interval between sunrise and sunset (call this "day_1") or to the "light of day," "sunlight" (call this "day_2"). The received opinion would claim, I suppose, that ἡμέρα in the Day analogy means "day_1," though commentators, with some exceptions, do not usually explain what they take it to mean here. In any case, there are insurmountable problems with this view. First, one simply cannot tell which meaning the term bears in the present passage. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to assign one or the other meaning to the term, since it most likely means both "day_1" and "day_2." Second, and more importantly, Parmenides' objection to the Day analogy hits the mark regardless of the meaning of ἡμέρα.

Plato of course uses the term in both of the meanings distinguished above. There are numerous instances of the use of ἡμέρα = day_1, the most significant of which is the one at *Tim.* 37e1–3, where ἡμέρα is said to be μέρος

[14]I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* 2 (Oxford 1963) 330–331. See also H. F. Cherniss, "Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato," *AJP* 53 (1932) 122–138, at 135; Cornford (above, n. 1) 85–87; A. L. Peck, "Plato's *Parmenides*: Some Suggestions for its Interpretation," CQ NS 3 (1953) 126–150, at 132; R. K. Sprague (above, n. 13) 96–99; W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* 5 (Oxford 1978) 41.

[15]R. H. Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogues* (Indianapolis 1973) 151.

χρόνου. The instances of the use of ἡμέρα = day_2 are not numerous, but they are sufficient for my purposes. For example, in *Prot.* 312a2–3 Socrates is able to see that Hippocrates is blushing because ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας. Obviously, ἡμέρας here means "daylight."[16] At *Tim.* 45b5 we are told that the fire which does not burn but provides a gentle light constitutes "the proper body of each day" (οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας σῶμα).[17] Here again ἡμέρας cannot mean anything else but "daylight." It would appear then that the decision as to the precise meaning of the term in any given case turns exclusively on the context. However, the context is rarely, if ever, decisive.

First, "day_1" always (necessarily) contains a reference to "light," since "day_1" is not merely a time interval but an interval of a certain quality, one during which there is sunlight (it is in this sense that "day" is opposed to "night"). It is thus impossible to talk of "day_1" without also thinking of "day_2."[18] Second, all instance of "day_2" may also be easily interpreted as instances of "day_1." I am thinking here of such expressions as ἡμέρας γιγνομένης (*Symp.* 223d8), or ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας (*Prot.* 312a2), or ἡμέρας δὲ ὄρθρου τε . . . (*Laws* 808d1) which, though referring primarily to "daylight," can be as naturally interpreted as referring to the beginning of the day = time interval. Even the star instance of "day_2," in the passage from the *Timaeus* I quoted earlier (45b5), can be interpreted as referring also to "day_1." The use of ἑκάστης in that line is rather odd, given that ἡμέρας refers to "daylight" (unless, of course, ἑκάστης means "of each *kind*," which seems impossible in the context). The very use of ἑκάστης makes one suspect that ἡμέρας here does, after all, mean "day = time interval," though this meaning is precluded by the rest of the context. In other words, Plato seems oblivious to the fact that the precise meaning of the term determines its logical behaviour or environment. For he treats here "day_2," which is a "mass" noun, as if it were "day_1," which is a "count" noun.[19] Furthermore, it would seem that he fails to see the logical difference between the two meanings precisely because to him the term means at once "day_1" and "day_2."

Supposing then that ἡμέρα in the Day analogy means "day_1" or "day_2" or both at once, still Parmenides is right to object to it. Let us assume that "day" means in the first place "day_2." In that case, when Socrates claims that one and the same day is in many places at once, he is in effect claiming that it

[16]W. K. C. Guthrie, *Protagoras and Meno* (Harmondsworth 1956) 41 nicely translates "a streak of daylight." The expression is synonymous to ἂν φῶς γένηται earlier at 311a5.

[17]I follow Cornford (*Plato's Cosmology* [London 1937] 152, n. 2) in taking σῶμα together with οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας.

[18]This tendency is nicely illustrated at *Laws* 775c3–4. In warning prospective parents of the dangers of drinking to their offspring, the Stranger urges them to be ever vigilant because . . . ἄδηλον ὁποία νὺξ ἢ φῶς αὐτὸ γεννήσει. Obviously φῶς here means day = time interval of a certain quality, i.e., during which there is light (as opposed to "night").

[19]See J. J. Katz, *Semantic Theory* (New York 1972) 374.

is one and the same daylight (sunlight) which bathes, as it were, at once all the objects on which it falls. Though true in a sense, this claim is not to the point.

One may suggest that the point at issue is not whether or not *one and the same* daylight is in many places at once, but whether or not it is the *whole* daylight that shines simultaneously on each of the many places under it. The reason why the issue is over the latter question is that the claim that some thing is "one and the same" does not provide an answer to the meaningful question "is it the *whole* or a *part* of one and the same thing?" Surely, what Socrates has to show is not merely that many places are simultaneously illuminated by one and the same daylight, but also that each of the many places is illuminated by the *whole* daylight at the same time as every other place is illuminated by the *whole* of the very same daylight. But the latter proposition seems to be false. Being a "mass" noun, "daylight" refers to a "single but scattered" concrete object,[20] and so it makes sense to talk of bundles or rays of daylight in the same way that it makes sense to talk of portions of water (another "mass" noun). Thus, the glass of water I may drink at the university cafeteria is only a portion of the whole (cosmic) water supply, and when I have drunk it I have certainly not consumed the *whole* of the water supply. Similarly, when Socrates is out in the daylight, he is *not* under the *whole* of it but rather under that particular bundle of it which happens to fall on him. And this is precisely the reason why there is enough of it left over to fall on the spots where Parmenides and Aristoteles happen to be. Thus the three of them are at once under three different bundles of one and the same daylight.

Let us now in turn assume that "day" means "day_1." In that case when he claims that one and the same day is in many places at once, Socrates is in effect claiming that a time interval is, at any given moment, simultaneous with itself at many different places. It follows from this that a time interval is at any moment "one and the same," since if any time interval x is simultaneous with any time interval y, then x and y are "one and the same" time interval. Though trivially true, this claim is not to the point.

One may suggest that the point at issue is not whether or not a time interval is simultaneous with itself at any given moment, but rather whether or not "any given moment" of the time interval is simultaneous and, hence, identical with the *whole* interval. The issue, to put it differently, is whether or not the many places existing at the same moment of day can be said to be under the *whole* of one and the same day. What Socrates has to show is not merely that one and the same day can be over many places at once, but also that the *whole* of the day is so present. No one would dispute that a given

[20] I borrow the phrase from W. V. O. Quine's *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960) 90 ff.

moment of day is just that moment of day and that, in this sense, the same moment is over many places at once. However, the question is whether or not that moment is the same as the *whole* day. A positive answer would, absurdly, collapse the *whole* day into any given *moment* of it. The answer to the question is clearly negative, because the (whole) day has duration, in the same way that a spatial object has extension, and successive moments of it are not simultaneous and, hence, not identical with one another nor with the whole day. Thus, what is over many places at once is not the whole day, but particular moments (parts) of it.

It may be objected that "day_1" here means not, as Parmenides and I take it, "a period of time measured," but rather "a time unit." Or, to put the objection differently, Socrates conceives of "day_1" as an Event and not as a Process, and it is precisely because he conceives of the day in these terms that he thinks that it provides a reasonable suggestion for how something can be neither divided into parts nor separate from itself and still be in many places at once. Supposing that this is how Socrates conceives of "day_1," Parmenides' point would still hold.

The suggestion that "day = event/time unit" is in many places at once without being either divided into parts or separate from itself, remains plausible only so long as we forget the crucial word ὅλον. It is of course true that we refer to "day = event" as a single, unitary thing and we ordinarily talk about it as if it were such a thing. The fact, however, that in language or thought "day" is a single, unitary entity does not entail that it is so in fact. If that were so, then World War II would be, absurdly, a single, unitary Event. The omission of ὅλον tends to put out of mind the ontological considerations, and it is surely significant that Socrates neglects to use ὅλον in his analogy, while Parmenides places the word emphatically at the end of his. In fact, he accuses Socrates of arguing "conveniently" (131b7–8, ἡδέως ποιεῖς) and the accusation is most likely over the omission of ὅλον. If the points made so far are basically sound, then the omission of ὅλον is crucial to Socrates' analogy. By the same token, attempts to give a reading of the argument with the "day_1" sense render Socrates' illustration either absurd or irrelevant. We should therefore reject the view that the "day_1" sense is intended at all and, hence, the view that the Sail analogy is *not* to the point.

I shall conclude my reply to the first two points made on behalf of the received opinion by collecting together some points which arise directly from the above discussion. First, the fact that we refer to the day as if it were a single, unitary entity, far from making the two analogies radically different, points to a crucial similarity between them, because we also refer to, and talk about, the sail as if it were a single, unitary thing. We do not ordinarily think of, say, the people under a sail (or a roof) as being covered severally by only a part of the sail (or the roof), though again this does not mean that the *entire* sail is above each and every one of them. It would

appear then that whatever differences many exist among "day_1" (however conceived), "day_2," and "sail" are not pertinent to the question of whether or not the two analogies are similar. What is relevant to that question is whether or not one can talk, in the appropriate sense, of parts of day, or of bundles of daylight, or of bits of sail. And the answer to this question is clearly positive. Second, the two analogies can be used interchangeably, though the Sail analogy has the merit of bringing out much more readily the ontological concerns. Consequently, Parmenides' substitution of the Sail analogy for the Day analogy is quite appropriate. The fact, moreover, that the two analogies are interchangeable can be used, as we shall see shortly, to undermine the third point made on behalf of the received opinion. Finally, on the supposition that Socrates conceives of the day as an Event or a time unit, the issue here would seem to be related to the distinction I alluded to earlier on between *functional* and *ontological* indivisibility. Thinking of functional indivisibility, Socrates insists that the day is indivisible *simpliciter*. Parmenides, on the other hand, insists that the day is divisible in precisely those ways in which a temporal or a spatial entity can be said to be ontologically divisible.

The last point made on behalf of the received opinion, that Socrates hesitates in accepting the Sail analogy, can be readily undermined. Socrates' hesitant reply need not be prompted by the alleged inappropriateness of Parmenides' illustration. At 131b7 ff., Parmenides charges that in the Day analogy Socrates was less than careful in claiming that one and the same thing can be in many places at once. Immediately after, he offers the Sail analogy as presumably another example which might support the same claim. Having done so, he asks Socrates, "ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν" (131b9). Now, a natural interpretation of Socrates' reply, ἴσως (131c1), is that he thinks that the Sail analogy may well serve the same purpose as his own. The hesitation, moreover, can be accounted for by the fact, quite natural in the dialectical setting, that the analogy is still in Parmenides' hands, and Socrates, like the rest of us, does not yet know what Parmenides will make of it.

Parmenides' Sail analogy yields an argument which refutes the view that the *entire* Form is *present in* each of its sensible instances. The refutation amounts to this: (i) If we think that, e.g., Socrates is white at the same time as Aristoteles is white, and Socrates and Aristoteles are necessarily at different places, then we cannot avoid the conclusion that whiteness is *in* different places at once, given that it is by the *presence* of whiteness in Socrates *and* Aristoteles that Socrates and Aristoteles are white. (ii) Furthermore, if it is the *whole* Form that is supposedly *present in* each of Socrates and Aristoteles, there must then be two numerically distinct whitenesses, one *in* Aristoteles and the other *in* Socrates, since it is not possible for one and the same entity to be present *in its entirety* in two different places at once.

Socrates' Day analogy is an attempt to forestall this kind of objection, and it is interesting both for what it does and for what it does not do.

Socrates might evade Parmenides' objection by simply denying one of the following two assumptions: (a) that the Form is just another particular or behaves like one, or (b) that the Form is present *in* its several instances. But to deny (b) is to reject outright the hypothesis under scrutiny. Although it is Plato's purpose to reject ultimately this hypothesis, it would be most inappropriate to his purposes to do so at this point, and thus end the exchange here. For we might then get the erroneous impression that the present difficulties might be circumvented by simply assuming that only a *part* of the Form is present *in* its instances. Plato of course wishes to guard against our making such an assumption. On the other hand, to deny (a) is in effect to deny (b), since the *only* reason for Parmenides' treating the Form as a particular is simply the hypothesis that the Form is *present in* its sensible instances. "Being present in" is intended to mean, and is taken by Parmenides as meaning, "being actually in as a constituent part." Socrates of course denies neither (a) nor (b); that is, he is not allowed to escape Parmenides' objections at this point because he could not do so without abandoning the view that the Forms are *in* their instances, that they are somehow in space and time.

What Socrates does do is to suggest that the Forms may, without difficulties, be in space and time. Lured by the initial plausibility of his analogy, Socrates simply insists that the Form can be *present in* each of its several sensible instances at once but it does not somehow, being a special thing, become "many." It seems to me then that the Day analogy is not a protest, as most commentators think, against the treatment of universals at the hands of Parmenides. Rather, it is a wavering reaffirmation of the point Parmenides seeks to impugn. Socrates does not complain that Parmenides misunderstood the point of his example. If he can be said to complain at all, Socrates might complain about Parmenides' unwillingness to see the special status accorded by him to the instantiated universal. For Parmenides insists in effect that what is instantiated *in* this place is a particular and not identical to what is instantiated *in* that place, which is a numerically (at least) distinct particular. Once it has been related to its sensible instances in the particular way envisaged here ("presence in"), the Form loses its claim to a special status. So long as we retain the hypothesis that *participation* is effected by, or is explicable as, the Form's presence in sensibles, the current difficulties can only be circumvented by assuming that a *part* of the *Form* is *present in* its instances. However, as we saw, this alternative is no escape at all.

III

If my reconstruction of the argument is basically sound, then the present exchange evinces, in my view, certain difficulties Plato might have felt over

two different aspects of the Form: its *function* and its *ontic structure*. By "function" I mean, very broadly, what the Form is capable of doing, its δύναμις vis à vis sensible reality. Thinking of its function, Plato has Socrates insist on the Form's *universality*, a notion which goes hand in hand with the Form's function as a *standard*, its capacity to explicate every single instance of sensible reality and, more importantly, to unify multiple instances of sensible reality, and thus render sensible reality intelligible to us. The Form, either as a whole or in part, must be present at once in *all* of its many participants, if by "Form" one means its function, since it is in its function that the Form is *universal*. It should be noted that the distinction or dichotomy, beloved of many commentators, between the "exemplar/standard" and the "universal" conception of the Form does not exist for Plato. For him, a Form is a universal standard and the problem, if it is one, of keeping the two notions distinct never arises. What vexes him is how to retain the Form's function as an universal standard without compromising the views he holds on its ontic structure. Being against a conceptualist or nominalist account of the Forms,[21] he feels that their own objective structure underpins and accounts for their function, and it is this feeling which, I believe, finds expression in his talk of participation, imitation, presence in, communion, and so forth. On the other hand, Plato is thinking of the specific conditions imposed on the Form's structure (i.e., its uniqueness, indivisibility, immutability) when he has Parmenides insist that if a Form is like the Day or the Sail, then it is involved in contradictions. Each Form is supposed to be an unique and indivisible something (ἕν ὄν) and it cannot be such if it is, or behaves, like the Sail or the Day.

It is especially important, in attempting to divine what underlies the present exchange, to note that a Form is unique and indivisible when it is considered, as it were, in and by itself, and that difficulties arise when it is put to work vis à vis the sensibles. Consciousness of these difficulties came gradually to Plato. In the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo* he proudly proclaims that the Forms, in and by themselves, are unique, simple, pure, and immutable. By the time he writes the *Republic* he begins to feel vaguely difficulties over the Forms' uniqueness, though he regards these as more apparent than real. I am thinking of the passage at *Resp.* 5.476a, where he suggests that it is true of all Forms that each of them is one (unique), but "because they appear everywhere in association with actions, and bodies and each other, each appears to be many."[22] The *Parmenides* reveals a courageous Plato confessing how the apparent problem of the *Republic* has become real and vexing in

[21]See *Parm.* 131b3 ff. and *Tim.* 51c.

[22]The remark is addressed not to the general public ("the lovers of sights and sounds") but to those who believe in the Theory of Forms. Hence, the problem is a problem for Platonists. Also, although Plato here feels that the problem is more apparent than real, he is nevertheless beginning to feel that there is something to worry about and dispose of.

the sense that he has no solution to it. That it remained vexing is evidenced by *Philebus* 15a–c2.

The problem which vexes Plato in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus* is in effect this. Why is it that the Forms, unique and indivisible in themselves, become "many," either by multiplication or division, whenever an attempt is made to use them to explain sensible reality? This problem Plato never resolved and, I believe, he could not see his way out of it because of a number of fundamental assumptions which were guiding his thinking.

I can do no more in this paper than outline some of these assumptions. One such general assumption is that ontic-structural considerations are prior and that, hence, all other considerations (including functional and epistemological) should reflect and parallel the ontic ones. More particularly, Plato insists on thinking that the Forms' function is necessarily and only dependent upon their (real, objective) ontic structure. The Forms' ontic structure determines their functional behaviour no less than it determines the cognitive states in which they may be apprehended.[23] That these assumptions are at the root of the present exchange is borne out, I think, by the three illustrations which follow the Sail analogy (i.e., 131c12–e2). I have already suggested that these illustrations are best construed as demonstrating the Forms' functional fragmentation, which is attendant, in Plato's view, upon the ontic fragmentation implicit in the conclusion of the Sail analogy. In other words, Plato thinks that functional considerations are dependent upon and parallel to ontic ones, so that if Forms are ontically divisible or divided, then their function must correspondingly be so as well[24] (and vice versa).

Indeed, the above assumption may explain what I have so far regarded as a confusion on Plato's part between functional and ontic indivisibility. Plato is not so much confused as unwilling to question his basic assumptions or unwilling to entertain the possibility that functional considerations are not necessarily dependent upon, or need not reflect, ontic ones. The argument in the *Parmenides* of the Forms as Thoughts (132b3–c11) may be of interest in this connection. Socrates offers the suggestion that Forms may be only "thoughts in the mind" (132b3–5) as a possible way of circumventing (see 132b5–6) the unpalatable conclusion of the "Third Man" Argument (132a1–b2) that there is an infinite number of Forms of each kind (132b1–2). Parmenides contends that Socrates' suggestion fails because, even if we start with Forms as Thoughts, we end up with Forms as objective realities, and we are back at the beginning, as it were, of the "Third Man" Argument.

[23]This applies also to sensible reality, though the structure of sensibles is not permanent. See the Divided Line in *Resp.* 6. Items which have no structure at all are "no-things" (see *Resp.* 5.478b–c).

[24]He is so bent on demonstrating this that he has to manipulate and contort the examples. See S. Panagiotou, "The Consequences of the Divisibility of Forms in Plato's *Parmenides*," *Phoenix* 36 (1982) 45–52.

Parmenides manages to come to this conclusion by suggesting that (a) we think of something as being "over many" because this something is truly, objectively some *one* thing, what the Platonists call an "idea" (132c3–4), and (b) we think of this something as "one" because it is truly, objectively "always the same something over many," what the Platonists call a "form" (132c6–7).[25] Parmenides' point is that any particular determination given to the Form by the human mind is conditioned by and based on certain objective facts about it. Hence, it is not true to say with Socrates that the Forms, if they are νοήματα, cannot properly have their origin anywhere else except in the mind (132b3–5 . . . τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον . . . νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄγγοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς). The Forms are not merely determinations of the human mind. The human mind, it is true, conceives them in certain ways, but such conceptions are not inventive acts but acts of discovering objective structures in *rerum natura*.

Parmenides does not allow the suggestion that the universality of the Form may be merely an aspect of its function, as determined by the human mind, because Plato believes that any function of the Form must have a basis in corresponding facts about its objective structure. The realization that this need not be the case might have marked the beginning of the resolution of the difficulties which vex Plato in the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*. But, of course, it would have also marked the beginning of the end, or a radical revision, of the Platonic theory of Forms. There is obviously a lot more to be said on this, but this is as far as I am able and willing to take it for now.

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[25]My interpretation of *Parm.* 132c3–7 turns on taking (a) νόημα νοεῖ of c3 to govern only ἐπί πᾶσιν ἐπόν but not also μίαν . . . ἰδέαν of c4, and (b) τό νοούμενον of c6 to govern only ἕν εἶναι but not also ἀεί . . . πᾶσιν of c7. The expression μίαν . . . ἰδέαν in c4 and ἀεί . . . πᾶσιν in c7 are not part of the "conception" but the facts, reasons behind it. If these expressions are indeed meant to be part of the "conception," I cannot then see how Parmenides is saying anything more than, "what the conceptualist means by his determination of something as 'one over many' is what we, Platonists, mean by a 'form'." However true this may be, it does not provide *a reason* for the conclusion Parmenides desires to get to, that the Forms are outside the mind. It may be objected that this is *not* the conclusion Parmenides is after; that all he is bent on showing is that as long as we posit, even on the conceptualist version, a "one-over-many" we are faced with the "Third Man." Two responses to this. First, in the absence of a demonstration by Parmenides, I cannot see how a conceptualist's "one-over-many" is liable to the difficulties of the "Third Man." Second, it would be rather odd that Parmenides is allowed to ignore the point, so emphatically made by Socrates, that Forms exist nowhere except in the mind.